Most of the talk about "FRBR-ization" (a terrible mis-nomer, but now common terminology) is about creating clusters of records that represent the same work. In fact, I'm of the opinion that the work level is of interest only to a few (for example, literary critics) -- what most users would like to see is the expression level. The expression is also the level that is needed for the various efforts to associate copyright information with bibliographic data.
In many cases, the work and expression are one and the same because the item has only been issued in one expression. For those, the distinction isn't of consequence.
Where there is more than one expression for the work, those expressions tend to take particular forms, at least for books: new editions, mainly for non-fiction; and translations. In both of these cases, I maintain that the expression level is what users want, not the work. (Non-book experts: does this carry through to other formats?)
My usual example of a translated work is Thomas Mann's Der Zauberberg. According to the cataloging rules, the work's title is Der Zauberberg, while expressions in our libraries may have the title in the language of the translation, e.g. The magic mountain. A FRBR-based work display would be something like:
Mann, Thomas
Der Zauberberg. 1924
This would be the work entry into The magic mountain for users in English-language catalogs, and I assume that many of those users would not recognize the German language title, nor want to go through this level to reach the translated version that they seek.
WorldCat has finessed this by keeping the translations separate -- in other words, WorldCat responds to a search with FRBR expression-level records. And I think this is more user-friendly than the work-level record would be.
The other case, that of editions, also argues for the importance of the FRBR expression-level, but the user needs may be different. In this case, the work level will be recognizable to the user, but the information about which is the latest edition/expression needs to be very clear so that the user does not mistakenly select an item that has been replaced or updated by a later edition. Using the Dewey decimal classification and relative index as our example of a work with many editions, WorldCat shows a single edition on its 'work' page, and I assumed that it was the latest, listed as "Ed. 20," "1989." In fact this isn't the latest edition -- there is a 22nd edition from 2003. Users would only find this by going to what seems to be the expression level where all editions are listed.
This shows how hard it is to create a single grouping for all records that serve the users' needs.
Meanwhile, I have another project that will be attempting to connect copyright information to bibliographic items, including linking to entries in the renewal database. Oddly enough, RDA lists the "copyright notice" element as being at the manifestation level, which seems wrong to me. Copyright is determined on the expression, at least for the two cases I have mentioned so far: each translation receives its own copyright, as does each distinct edition. That these may be republished in a variety of manifestations (hard back, paperback, large print, etc.) does not change their copyright status.
We cannot, however, link copyright information to works. There is no copyright in Der Zauberberg or in the Decimal Classification as a work; copyright will instead be on each expression. So for the purposes of linking to copyright information, it seems that we would ideally have a way to group items by expression. If not, then the only proper link would be on the manifestation, even though that means some repetition. What will make all of this difficult is that we won't often have a date that we can associate with the expression, only with the manifestation, and that isn't necessarily the copyright date. (Except when it is, of course. You librarians reading this know what I mean.)
It still baffles me that we don't include a transcription of the copyright statement on the book or item when we create library bibliographic data, considering how useful that could be. Yet, when I proposed the copyright statement field for the MARC record there was great opposition. Some things I just don't get.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Monday, November 03, 2008
Determining Copyright Status
Among the many interesting bits in the Google/AAP agreement is Section E which essentially lays out in detail what steps Google must take to determine if an item is or is not in the public domain. As we know, this is not easy. The agreement states that two people must view the title page of the work (yes, it says "two people") to determine if the item has a copyright notice, and to check the place of publication. To determine if copyright has been renewed, "Google shall search either the United States Copyright Renewal Records or a copy thereof." If a renewal record isn't found, and the work has a copyright date before 1964, then it is presumed to be in the public domain.
I decided to try this out, at least the part about checking the renewal. I did my searches in two databases: Stanford's and Rutgers'.
I happen to have a copy of Orwell's 1984 with detailed copyright notices. It lists the first copyright as 1949, by Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc. It then says "Copyright renewed 1977 by Sonia Brownell Orwell." It also includes "Copyright 1984 by Virgin Cinema Films Limited" although I must say that I'm not sure why that latter copyright notice is in the book.
A search on '1984' in the Rutgers' database yields no hits, but using the author's name I find 37 items, of which one reads:
Picking up another book of the right age, I have Proust's "The Captive" in the Modern Library edition, the "C. K. Scott Moncrieff" translation, with "Copyright, 1929, by Random House, Inc." on the title page.
In Stanford's database I get:
In Rutgers I get:
This next (and last) one is an especially interesting case. I have a copy of Rebecca West's "Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia" printed by Penguin books in 1994. It gives the copyright date as "1940, 1941" and the renewal date as "1968, 1969", both under the name of Rebecca West.
A search on the title in Rutgers' database gets me these three records:
As you can tell, some part of the book was originally published in the Atlantic Monthly as a serial. From these records it's difficult to tell exactly what issues of the monthly it was included in, and the "Claimants" are all different. In the Stanford database it's a bit more clear. There are five records; four are duplicates for the original articles in the Atlantic Monthly and one more called "Additions." Each of the four duplicate records is like this one:
Even for the human searcher, it may be difficult to connect the book and the records because there is nothing in the book itself to indicate that it was previously published in a journal. In fact, the introduction merely mentions that the book itself was first published in two volumes in 1941.
The book was published in two volumes because it is nearly 1200 pages long. The archives of the Atlantic Monthly list the four articles with this same name as containing 24, 24, 26, and 24 pages, respectively. It's rather hard to understand how those articles, as copyrighted, could be the same as a 1200 page book. We are left only with the record that claims to be "Additions" and that has the same subtitle as the book:
Underlying this statement: "To determine if copyright has been renewed, "Google shall search either the United States Copyright Renewal Records or a copy thereof" is a great deal more complexity than that one sentence implies. It makes me wonder if the negotiators for the AAP are fully aware of how inaccurate the results might be. (An example: the author field in a record for an article by George Orwell reads: "Author George Orwell. U. S. ed. pub. as Shooting an elephant, 26Oct50, A49135".) If they are aware of it, then I must commend them for taking the practical path and allowing Google to make books available based on this evidence. If a copyright holder notifies Google that a book has been determined to be public domain in error, Google is obliged to change the status of the work from public domain to "in copyright," but is not held liable for infringement if the steps for determining public domain were followed and documented as laid out in the agreement.
It will be hard to determine, however, if Google should happen to err on the side of copyright, and lists as under copyright works that are actually in the public domain. While copyright holders can be expected to make sure that their works are properly protected, works in the public domain have no rights holder to monitor their status, and no one assigned to protect the public interest.
One other caveat, which appears in Section E, is:
[Note: keep an eye on the Open Library and Creative Commons for some work on copyright determination that will be openly accessible.]
I decided to try this out, at least the part about checking the renewal. I did my searches in two databases: Stanford's and Rutgers'.
I happen to have a copy of Orwell's 1984 with detailed copyright notices. It lists the first copyright as 1949, by Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, Inc. It then says "Copyright renewed 1977 by Sonia Brownell Orwell." It also includes "Copyright 1984 by Virgin Cinema Films Limited" although I must say that I'm not sure why that latter copyright notice is in the book.
A search on '1984' in the Rutgers' database yields no hits, but using the author's name I find 37 items, of which one reads:
AUTH: George Orwell, translation: Amelie Audiberti. NM: translation.A search in the Stanford database gets me:
TITL: 1984.
ODAT: 1Jul50; DREG: 7Nov77 RREG: R678090. RCLM: AFO-2377. Amelie Audiberti, nee Elisabeth Savane (A)
Both of these seem to be for the same item, and it's a translation of the book 1984. The renewal listed in the book for the English text is not in the databases. The instructions to Google say nothing about taking renewal dates from the book, so this one would appear to be in the public domain by the agreement's criteria.Title 1984 NM: translation
Author George Orwell, translation: Amelie Audiberti
Registration Date 1Jul50
Renewal Date 7Nov77
Registration Number AFO-2377
Renewal Id R678090
Renewing Entity Amelie Audiberti, nee Elisabeth Savane (A)
Picking up another book of the right age, I have Proust's "The Captive" in the Modern Library edition, the "C. K. Scott Moncrieff" translation, with "Copyright, 1929, by Random House, Inc." on the title page.
In Stanford's database I get:
Title The captive. Translated by C. K. Scott Monorieff
Author PROUST, MARCEL
Registration Date 27Jun29
Renewal Date 7Sep56
Registration Number A9965
Renewal Id R176423
Renewing Entity Random House, Inc. (PWH)
In Rutgers I get:
CLNA: RANDOM HOUSE, INC.Unfortunately, this latter doesn't include a date, so I'm not sure that this record provides sufficient information. Fortunately, the Stanford database gives more information. Unfortunately, the Stanford record gives the title and what we librarians would call the "statement of responsibility" in the same field, and misspells the name of the translator. This may make it more difficult for any automated matching of the records. (I am assuming that Google will be doing automated matching, not hand searching of the database. That may be a mistaken assumption, especially since they have agreed that two humans will view the title page.)
TITL: The captive.
XREF: Proust, Marcel.
This next (and last) one is an especially interesting case. I have a copy of Rebecca West's "Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia" printed by Penguin books in 1994. It gives the copyright date as "1940, 1941" and the renewal date as "1968, 1969", both under the name of Rebecca West.
A search on the title in Rutgers' database gets me these three records:
CLNA: WEST, ROBERT.
TITL: Black lamb and grey falcon. (In Atlantic monthly, Feb.-May 1941)
ODAT: 21Jan41 OREG: B482882; 19Feb41 RREG: Rebecca West ; 12Aug68; R441634-441631.
CLNA: WEST, REBECCA.
TITL: Black lamb and grey falcon; a journey through Yugoslavia. Pub. serially in the Atlantic monthly, Dec. 17, 1940-Apr. 17, 1941. NM: additions.
ODAT: 20Oct41; A158501 RREG: Rebecca West ; 10Jan69; R453530.
CLNA: WEST PUB. CO.
TITL: Black lamb and grey falcon. (In The Atlantic monthly, Jan. 1941)
ODAT: 20Dec40; B479489 RREG: Rebecca West ; 2Jan68; R426137.
As you can tell, some part of the book was originally published in the Atlantic Monthly as a serial. From these records it's difficult to tell exactly what issues of the monthly it was included in, and the "Claimants" are all different. In the Stanford database it's a bit more clear. There are five records; four are duplicates for the original articles in the Atlantic Monthly and one more called "Additions." Each of the four duplicate records is like this one:
I suppose that the four renewal records are one for each item in the Atlantic Monthly, but they each have the same information. Only the fifth record, the one for "additions," includes the subtitle that appears on the book. The presence of the article records is puzzling because Stanford claims to have included only records for the renewal of books. In fact, it is easy to find records for articles in the database, so it's probably best to assume that the database covers text in general.Title Black lamb and grey falcon. (In Atlantic monthly, Feb.-May 1941)
Author WEST, REBECCA.
Registration Date 21Jan41, 19Feb41,21Mar41 21Apr41
Renewal Date 12Aug68
Registration Number B482882, B488595, , B492319,, B495868
Renewal Id R441633
Renewing Entity Rebecca West (A)
Even for the human searcher, it may be difficult to connect the book and the records because there is nothing in the book itself to indicate that it was previously published in a journal. In fact, the introduction merely mentions that the book itself was first published in two volumes in 1941.
The book was published in two volumes because it is nearly 1200 pages long. The archives of the Atlantic Monthly list the four articles with this same name as containing 24, 24, 26, and 24 pages, respectively. It's rather hard to understand how those articles, as copyrighted, could be the same as a 1200 page book. We are left only with the record that claims to be "Additions" and that has the same subtitle as the book:
Again, title field contains quite a bit of information beyond the title, and it just isn't crystal clear to me that this record is for the book and not for the articles. If it is for the book, then the idea that 1200 pages were published serially over four journal issues is quite a stretch. Plus, the Monthly archive claims that the dates are Jan, Feb, Apr and May, 1941.Title Black lamb and grey falcon; a journey through Yugoslavia.
Pub. serially in the Atlantic monthly, Dec. 17, 1940-Apr. 17, 1941.
NM: additions
Author WEST, REBECCA
Registration Date 20Oct41
Renewal Date 10Jan69
Registration Number A158501
Renewal Id R453530
Renewing Entity Rebecca West (A)
Underlying this statement: "To determine if copyright has been renewed, "Google shall search either the United States Copyright Renewal Records or a copy thereof" is a great deal more complexity than that one sentence implies. It makes me wonder if the negotiators for the AAP are fully aware of how inaccurate the results might be. (An example: the author field in a record for an article by George Orwell reads: "Author George Orwell. U. S. ed. pub. as Shooting an elephant, 26Oct50, A49135".) If they are aware of it, then I must commend them for taking the practical path and allowing Google to make books available based on this evidence. If a copyright holder notifies Google that a book has been determined to be public domain in error, Google is obliged to change the status of the work from public domain to "in copyright," but is not held liable for infringement if the steps for determining public domain were followed and documented as laid out in the agreement.
It will be hard to determine, however, if Google should happen to err on the side of copyright, and lists as under copyright works that are actually in the public domain. While copyright holders can be expected to make sure that their works are properly protected, works in the public domain have no rights holder to monitor their status, and no one assigned to protect the public interest.
One other caveat, which appears in Section E, is:
Any determination by Google that a work is a Public Domain Book is solely for the purposes of Section 3.2(d)(v) and is not to be relied on or invoked for any other purposes, including determining whether a work is in fact in the public domain under the Copyright Act.Basically, this means that just because Google determines that a book is in the public domain doesn't mean that's the legal status of the book. It also means that the rest of us can't use the excuse: "But Google says it's in the public domain." I have not heard whether Google will make the documentation of its copyright search available, and it's that documentation that has the real value. It's kind of like algebra: the answer is important, but what really matters is how you got the answer.
[Note: keep an eye on the Open Library and Creative Commons for some work on copyright determination that will be openly accessible.]
Google/AAP settlement
This Google/AAP settlement has hit my brain like a steel ball in a pinball machine, careening around and setting off bells and lights in all directions. In other words, where do I start?
Reading the FAQ (not the full 140+ page document), it seems to go like this:
Google makes a copy of a book.
Google lets people search on words in the book.
Google lets people pay to see the book, perhaps buy the book, with some money going to the rights holder.
Google manages all of this with a registry of rights.
Now, replace the word "Google" above with "Kinko's."
Next, replace the word "Google" above with "A library."
TILT! If Google is allowed to do this, shouldn't anyone be allowed to do it? Is Jeff Bezos kicking himself right now for playing by the rules? Did Google win by going ahead and doing what no one else dared to do? Can they, like Microsoft, flaunt the law because they can buy their way out of any legal pickle?
TILT! Were any public libraries asked about this? Does anyone have an idea of what it will cost them to 1) manage this limited access and pay-per-page printing 2) obtain more licenses when demand rises? Remember when public libraries only had one machine hooked up to the Internet? Is this the free taste that leads to the Google Books habit?
Reading the FAQ (not the full 140+ page document), it seems to go like this:
Google makes a copy of a book.
Google lets people search on words in the book.
Google lets people pay to see the book, perhaps buy the book, with some money going to the rights holder.
Google manages all of this with a registry of rights.
Now, replace the word "Google" above with "Kinko's."
Next, replace the word "Google" above with "A library."
TILT! If Google is allowed to do this, shouldn't anyone be allowed to do it? Is Jeff Bezos kicking himself right now for playing by the rules? Did Google win by going ahead and doing what no one else dared to do? Can they, like Microsoft, flaunt the law because they can buy their way out of any legal pickle?
Ping! Next thought: we already have vendors of e-books who provide this service for libraries. They serve up digital, encoded versions of the books, not scans of pages. These digital books often have some very useful features, such as allowing the user to make notes, copy quotes of a certain length, create bookmarks, etc. The current Google Books offering is very feature poor. Also, because it is based on scans, there is no flowing of pages to fit the screen. The OCR is too poor to be useful to the sight-impaired. And if they sell books, what will the format be?
TILT! Will it even be legal for a publicly-funded library to provide Google books if they aren't ADA compliant?
Ping! This one I have to quote:
"Public libraries are eligible to receive one free Public Access Service license for a computer located on-site at each of their library buildings in the United States. Public libraries will also be able to purchase a subscription which would allow them to offer access on additional terminals within the library building and would eliminate the requirement of a per page printing fee. Higher education institutions will also be eligible to receive free Public Access Service licenses for on-site computers, the exact number of which will depend on the number of students enrolled."
TILT! Were any public libraries asked about this? Does anyone have an idea of what it will cost them to 1) manage this limited access and pay-per-page printing 2) obtain more licenses when demand rises? Remember when public libraries only had one machine hooked up to the Internet? Is this the free taste that leads to the Google Books habit?
Ping! The e-book vendors only provide books where they have an agreement with the publishers, thus no orphan works are included. So, will Google's niche mainly consist of providing access to orphan works? Or will the current e-book vendors be forced out of the market because Google's total base is larger, even though the product may be inferior?
Ping! We already have a licensor of rights, the Copyright Clearance Center, and it was founded with the support of the very folks (the AAP) who have now agreed to create another organization, funded initially by Google and responding only to the licensing of Google-held content.
TILT! Google books gets its own licensing service, its own storefront... can anyone compete with that? And what happens to anything that Google doesn't have?
Ping! It looks like Google will collect fees on all books that are not in the public domain. This means that users will pay to view orphan works, even though a vast number of them are actually in the public domain. Unclaimed fees will go to pay for the licensing service. Thus, users will be paying for the service itself, and will be paying to view books they should be able to access freely and for free.
Ping! We have a copyright office run by the US government. I'm beginning to wonder what that Copyright Office does, however, since we now have two non-profit organizations in the business of managing rights, plus others getting into the game, such as OCLC with its rights assessment registry, and folks like Creative Commons. Shouldn't the Copyright Office be the go-to place to find out who owns the rights to a work? Shouldn't we be scanning the documents held by the Copyright Office that tell us who has rights? (Note: the famed renewal database is actually a scan of the INDEX to the copyright renewal documents, not the full information about renewal.) Even if we had access to every copyright registration document in the Copyright Office, would we know who owns various rights? I think not. And how much of this will change with the Google opt-in system? I get the feeling that we'll maybe resolve some small percentage of rights questions, somewhere in the order of 2-5%. And it will, in the end, all be paid for by readers, or by libraries on behalf of readers.
TILT! Rights holders can opt-out of the Google Books database. If (when) Google has the monopoly on books online, opt-out will be a nifty form of censorship. Actually, censorship aimed directly at Google will be a nifty form of censorship.
GAME OVER. All your book belong to us.
Saturday, October 18, 2008
The Semantics of Semantic
I've always had a hard time with the Semantic Web because it didn't appear to me to be semantic at all. Thus I started calling it the Syntactic Web since it seemed to be mainly about structure, more like diagramming sentences than having a conversation. I now think I understand why that is.
If you are like me, you assume the term "semantic" is about meaning, and in particular the meaning in words and language. That's what you'll find in the dictionary. It is only recently that I learned that there is another use of the term "semantic" and that is in an area of mathematics called "formal semantics". Basically, formal semantics are about formal languages, such as mathematics, programming languages, and such. You can perform operations, often called "inferences," based on the rules of formal languages. This is an example:
A ☠ B
B ☠ C
therefore, A ☠ C
Using some set of rules, this statement is true even though A, B and C are black boxes, as is the relationship "☠". The statement after "therefore" can be calculated without ever considering that A, B or C have any meaning beyond being the symbols A, B and C.
This is a whole different meaning of "meaning" compared to the meaning of words in the human language sense. This is the kind of meaning that works with machines and algorithms and is therefore quite suited to automation. And it is this meaning of semantic that is meant for the Semantic Web.
Well, no wonder those of us who aren't mathematicians (or more specifically, involved in the use of formal languages) have been confused by the Semantic Web! It isn't semantic at all in the human language sense, it is mainly about structure and syntax. It's a shame that its developers used the confusing term "semantic" in its name. Although not incorrect, it is definitely a minority view of the meaning (that is, the semantics) of the term, and leads to confusion.
With this new knowledge, I would characterize the semantic web as a basic structure within which one could insert human-meaningful data, and a set of rules that make that structure operational in a computing environment. It greatly resembles the structure of simple human utterances, like "Moby Dick is the title of this book," although the semantic web would express this something like:
URI:abcd (has relation) URI:1234 (with) URI:xxzz
While Semantic Web devotees may be enthusiastic about that statement, most of us are going to get more out of: "Moby Dick is the title of this book." In other words, we only connect with the statement when it has human-understandable meaning; the formal language alone just doesn't do it. It's rather like the difference between the architectural drawings and the actual building: architects can understand what the drawings represent, but most of us will have to wait until the building is completed and we can walk though it in order to experience what the drawings mean.
Now I have to ask myself what to do with this knowledge. I don't think it makes sense to require everyone to be an architect in order to walk through a building, and I know for sure that all of us can speak in sentences even if we aren't experts in linguistics. So it should be possible to interact with, nay even be an active creator of, the semantic web without being conversant with the field of formal semantics. At the moment, though, I don't know how that's going to work, but I do know that if it doesn't work that way the Semantic Web isn't going very far. It just has to become wysiwim - what you see is what I mean. I suggest something Pipes-like might do the trick.
If you are like me, you assume the term "semantic" is about meaning, and in particular the meaning in words and language. That's what you'll find in the dictionary. It is only recently that I learned that there is another use of the term "semantic" and that is in an area of mathematics called "formal semantics". Basically, formal semantics are about formal languages, such as mathematics, programming languages, and such. You can perform operations, often called "inferences," based on the rules of formal languages. This is an example:
A ☠ B
B ☠ C
therefore, A ☠ C
Using some set of rules, this statement is true even though A, B and C are black boxes, as is the relationship "☠". The statement after "therefore" can be calculated without ever considering that A, B or C have any meaning beyond being the symbols A, B and C.
This is a whole different meaning of "meaning" compared to the meaning of words in the human language sense. This is the kind of meaning that works with machines and algorithms and is therefore quite suited to automation. And it is this meaning of semantic that is meant for the Semantic Web.
Well, no wonder those of us who aren't mathematicians (or more specifically, involved in the use of formal languages) have been confused by the Semantic Web! It isn't semantic at all in the human language sense, it is mainly about structure and syntax. It's a shame that its developers used the confusing term "semantic" in its name. Although not incorrect, it is definitely a minority view of the meaning (that is, the semantics) of the term, and leads to confusion.
With this new knowledge, I would characterize the semantic web as a basic structure within which one could insert human-meaningful data, and a set of rules that make that structure operational in a computing environment. It greatly resembles the structure of simple human utterances, like "Moby Dick is the title of this book," although the semantic web would express this something like:
URI:abcd (has relation) URI:1234 (with) URI:xxzz
While Semantic Web devotees may be enthusiastic about that statement, most of us are going to get more out of: "Moby Dick is the title of this book." In other words, we only connect with the statement when it has human-understandable meaning; the formal language alone just doesn't do it. It's rather like the difference between the architectural drawings and the actual building: architects can understand what the drawings represent, but most of us will have to wait until the building is completed and we can walk though it in order to experience what the drawings mean.
Now I have to ask myself what to do with this knowledge. I don't think it makes sense to require everyone to be an architect in order to walk through a building, and I know for sure that all of us can speak in sentences even if we aren't experts in linguistics. So it should be possible to interact with, nay even be an active creator of, the semantic web without being conversant with the field of formal semantics. At the moment, though, I don't know how that's going to work, but I do know that if it doesn't work that way the Semantic Web isn't going very far. It just has to become wysiwim - what you see is what I mean. I suggest something Pipes-like might do the trick.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
More Puzzling over FRBR
FRBR came up often in our discussions at DC2008. In particular, there were many attempts to clarify what FRBR means in a technical environment. Since FRBR is about entities and relationships, it seems to be perfectly positioned as the first step in the transformation of library data to the semantic web.
After each such event where ideas about FRBR are thrown around, I go back to FRBR and try to understand it. Each time it's as if I'm reading and thinking about an entirely different model. So here's this week's entry into the multiple personalities of FRBR.
During this reading I focused on the relationships between the entities, such as the relationship between expression and work, and the various work/work, expression/expression (etc.) relationships. What struck me immediately is that there is a fair amount of detail in the explication of the relationships between different Group 1 entities (work/work, etc.). These turn out to be the richest set of relationships in FRBR. At the same time, the relationships between Work-Expression-Manifestation-Item are covered by a single sentence each:
Work: a distinct intellectual or artistic creation
Expression: the intellectual or artistic realization of a work
Manifestation: physical embodiment of an expression of a work
Item: exemplar of a manifestation
Only one example is given for each. Compare that to table 5.1 on page 63 of the FRBR document, which gives these relationships between works:
successor
supplement
complement
summarization
adaptation
transformation
imitation
It seems much easier to see the real world applicability of these relationships than "intellectual...realization of a work." The sum of the lists of the relationships inherent in the Group 1 entities embodies much of the network of bibliographic interactions that will interest us in the semantic web. In fact, these relationships are probably closer to the needs of users than those of WEMI. I would like to explore these relationships further to understand what they reveal in terms of the development of a navigable route through the bibliographic world.
Meanwhile, I have some comments on those relationships. To begin with, I find it very interesting that there is no priviledged "first expression" of a work. Admittedly the first expression may not be known, but in fact the expressions are all equal and all have the same relationship with the work. This means that you can indicate that one expression is a translation of the other, and the translation then has the same relationship to the work as does the expression in the original language (which may - or may not - be the original expression). This seems to defy the concept of the uniform title or work title, which represents the original language of expression, and therefore says something about the "originality" of the first expression.
Another thing is that the list of relationships I give above are also valid between expressions. This is adds to the obscurity of the difference between works and expressions. There are, however, times when it makes sense to me: you could have a film version of Romeo and Juliet that is based on a particular expression of Shakespeare's work. The "workness" of the film also has some relationship with the "workness" of the play (adaptation? transformation?). Yet in general I have trouble with work-work relationships since there really is no work without an expression, therefore it's hard to say that work A adapts work B. I suspect this is just the general uneasiness with the abstractness of the work, but it seems amplified when you try to add relationships to this very fuzzy concept. The relationships between expressions make more sense to me.
Something else that occurs to me is that the transformative relationships make sense between expressions (translation, adaptation) and the intellectual relationships make sense between works (imitation, successor, others?). That an imitation is based on a particular expression (whatever the imitator had in hand) is almost a secondary relationship. What this means is that the work-work relationships and the expression-work or expression-expression relationships with the same name may not be identical. In fact, they couldn't possibly be identical because they refer to different types of entities. So although they have the same names, I would argue that they are not the same relationships, in the same way that the work title and the manifestation title are distinct even though they are both called 'title'.
I end this lengthy, rambling brain dump with the thought that we might be able to create a rich network of expressions, linked handily to their respective works, that would be very useful for those seeking information. And that the network of expressions could help us identify the appropriate work for each expression, because once an expression is found to be a translation of another, then they must logically be expressions of the same work.
Forgive me if this is all a re-hash of the obvious. For some reason, nothing in FRBR comes to me easily.
Monday, September 29, 2008
DC2008
I recently attended the annual Dublin Core conference in Berlin. I would have blogged the sessions but in fact I spent most of my time in the hallways chatting with folks. The main message of the conference was: Semantic Web. This included an interesting talk by Martin Malmsten on turning MARC records into RDF triples. (See also the work at Talis in this area.)
For me the big deal of the conference was a meeting with some of the Dublin Core folks who developed the DC Abstract Model and the DC Application Profile model. We had a nice long talk about the distance between those views and the actual production of library metadata. What we concluded was that we will work together to bridge this gap, in part by creating simple, re-usable modules that are easy to understand and that, when hooked together, provide the information necessary to engineer a fully functioning, DCAM-compliant application profile.
Yes, I know we need more of an explanation, and I'll be working on that very soon. Don't go too far away.
For me the big deal of the conference was a meeting with some of the Dublin Core folks who developed the DC Abstract Model and the DC Application Profile model. We had a nice long talk about the distance between those views and the actual production of library metadata. What we concluded was that we will work together to bridge this gap, in part by creating simple, re-usable modules that are easy to understand and that, when hooked together, provide the information necessary to engineer a fully functioning, DCAM-compliant application profile.
Yes, I know we need more of an explanation, and I'll be working on that very soon. Don't go too far away.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Functional Requirements for App Profiles
In preparation for DC2008 (9/22-26, Berlin), I've been thinking about application profiles. The DC folks have developed a structure for application profiles which I have attempted to use for the DC-RDA work. I ran into some difficulties, in part because the library community has its own particular needs. So I thought it would be a good idea to articulate these needs in preparation for discussions I hope we will have next week.
I'm going to use some terminology from FRBR, and some from the DC work. Mainly, I'll use "entity" in the FRBR sense. I'll use "property" in the sense that it is used in the DCAM and in RDF.
Here's my first pass at what we need to express in an application profile for the library community:
entities
We need to define the entities that will be in our metadata environment. It would be ideal to be able to re-use entities where possible. So if two APs can use the same Person entity, they just need to be able to identify it. At the same time, it must be possible to create a different person entity and to give it a new identifier.
relationships between entities
It some cases it will be desirable to constrain the relationships that can exist between entities. Both RDA and FRBR constrain which Group 2 entities have relationships with a Work as opposed to an Expression. This is an area of some disagreement among sub-communities, so there will be some APs that will define the relationships differently.
properties of entities
Entities have properties. These are metadata elements that have been defined outside of the AP. Each property must have a unique identifier. It is the detailed information about the properties that will make up the bulk of the AP. Here is a first list of what that information needs to be:
I'm musing over whether we need to be able to define a "record," mainly to say what the minimum is that someone could expect to receive.
I'm also considering the need to define relationships between records -- like the FRBR work/work and work/part relationships. As I said in my post on linking, I see a difference between dependent and independent links, and these, in my mind, would be independent links, and may point beyond a particular database or system. I'll think more about this, and welcome comments.
I'm going to use some terminology from FRBR, and some from the DC work. Mainly, I'll use "entity" in the FRBR sense. I'll use "property" in the sense that it is used in the DCAM and in RDF.
Here's my first pass at what we need to express in an application profile for the library community:
entities
We need to define the entities that will be in our metadata environment. It would be ideal to be able to re-use entities where possible. So if two APs can use the same Person entity, they just need to be able to identify it. At the same time, it must be possible to create a different person entity and to give it a new identifier.
relationships between entities
It some cases it will be desirable to constrain the relationships that can exist between entities. Both RDA and FRBR constrain which Group 2 entities have relationships with a Work as opposed to an Expression. This is an area of some disagreement among sub-communities, so there will be some APs that will define the relationships differently.
properties of entities
Entities have properties. These are metadata elements that have been defined outside of the AP. Each property must have a unique identifier. It is the detailed information about the properties that will make up the bulk of the AP. Here is a first list of what that information needs to be:
- property identifier
- property is mandatory/option
- property is repeatable/not (within entity)
- properties are cumulative/mutually exclusive -- a way to say that you can use property A or B or C, or that you can use any combination of A, B, C.
- property value is controlled/uncontrolled -- this distinguishes between free text (e.g. an abstract, user tags) and a constrained set of values (authority list, or a designated format). If controlled, then there needs to be a way to give some information on the type of control: URI of a list of terms; URI of a standard format for the data (e.g. date type format, or AACR2 name heading format).
- property value is transcribed/supplied -- transcribed data are taken directly from the resource itself; supplied means source of the information is not the resource. (Title can be transcribed; subject headings are supplied.)
- for controlled property values that use a set list of values, it has to be possible to state the vocabularies that are valid, and whether or not they are mandatory or optional. It may also be necessary to define whether one can extend the vocabulary in the metadata (e.g. use an unlisted value if a new value is needed). It needs to be stated whether the entire vocabulary is to be used. If not, the AP needs to define which values from the full vocabulary are valid. It also needs to be possible to create a list of values within the AP for any element. In this case there is no external controlled list.
I'm musing over whether we need to be able to define a "record," mainly to say what the minimum is that someone could expect to receive.
I'm also considering the need to define relationships between records -- like the FRBR work/work and work/part relationships. As I said in my post on linking, I see a difference between dependent and independent links, and these, in my mind, would be independent links, and may point beyond a particular database or system. I'll think more about this, and welcome comments.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)